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An:des

Lithuanian public case: Revolut Bank UAB

Revolut Bank UAB — AML monitoring deficiencies

Jurisdiction
Lithuania · regulation and compliance
Date
8 Apr 2025
Status
Documented milestone of 8 April 2025: administrative settlement, EUR 3.5 million fine and corrective plan. The source does not establish full implementation of the plan or a money-laundering offence. The exact inspection period is unavailable.

In Lithuania, the Bank of Lithuania announced an administrative settlement with Revolut Bank UAB on 8 April 2025. The supervisor identified deficiencies in monitoring relationships and transactions; the bank acknowledged them and agreed to a corrective plan and an administrative fine of EUR 3.5 million. The inspection preceded the announcement, but its exact period was not recovered. The source establishes neither full implementation of the plan nor a money-laundering offence.

In this fictional scene, Entidad Umbral reviews twenty simulated alerts in one An:des matter, identified for illustration as AML-01. In this fictional matter, an independent reviewer compares each return with the tool’s activity log and underlying operational records supplied under authorisation.

What is gathered

In this fictional scene, Entidad Umbral reviews twenty simulated alerts in one An:des matter, identified for illustration as AML-01. Its lead supplies an export marked “closed,” the current procedure and review notes. Some identifiers have no supporting note; others reference an earlier procedure version. Administrative closure alone does not demonstrate that the required analysis was carried out.

Who reviews and what Érika prepares

In this fictional matter, an analyst uses An:des to prepare G1: a matrix of identifiers, applicable versions, available reasoning and exceptions. A compliance reviewer checks the fictional records under restricted access. Érika notifies the AML lead: “AML-01: closures lack documented review and procedure-version references differ; decide review scope.” No assumption is made that an alert represents unlawful activity.

The decision

In this fictional matter, the competent AML lead reviews G1 and records G2. Approval covers only review plan v1.0: re-examine alerts without notes, resolve version references and document individual reasoning. Unsupported closures remain outstanding. The decision authorises no external reports and makes no claim of completed remediation. The package preserves the exact file list and the approved instructions.

The execution

In this fictional matter, assigned staff retrieve plan v1.0 from An:des and perform reviews in Entidad Umbral’s existing authorised alert-management tool. They record their reasoning there and return notes, references and permitted extracts to the same AML-01 matter. An:des does not automatically monitor transactions, close alerts or submit suspicious transaction reports; execution remains with the authorised staff.

The verification

In this fictional matter, an independent reviewer compares each return with the tool’s activity log and underlying operational records supplied under authorisation. G3 checks authorship, substance and correspondence, not just receipt or a hash. A missing note or failed return triggers recovery or a repeated documented review. PoD retains findings and exceptions without certifying overall compliance or control effectiveness.

What changes afterwards

In this fictional matter, the AML lead keeps unresolved exceptions open and assigns further review. Reviewing these twenty alerts does not establish system-wide effectiveness. If the procedure, a source or a closure condition changes, the lead revalidates G1, authorises a revised version through G2 and requires G3 checks of execution. PoD keeps the limited scope and outstanding work visible.

Sources and documents

Official and press sources, each with its date. The scene uses a fictional organisation and does not describe real An:des work for the company named. The schematic illustration is not a photograph of the event.

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